"Intentions, Embodiment, and Causal Powers"

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The Davidsonian standard theory of action has been dominant in step with the standard theory in the philosophy of mind, i.e., the mind-brain token identity theory including the functionalism. In recent years, however, an alternative approach to mind has been attracting attention. It can be called "the embodied approach to mind" and it takes our mind as not identical with our brain, but as beyond it and extending over our body (and even our environment). If we take this new approach seriously, what can we say about action? In the philosophy of action, it seems to me, the embodied approach has not yet been sufficiently taken seriously.

The embodied approach has been greatly influenced by the phenomenological works, e.g., by Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. Phenomenology takes the first-person perspective as opposed to the third-person perspective, and considers things in the world as what our intentional attitudes are directed towards. Further contribution of phenomenology is to emphasize that our intentional attitudes are embodied.

In order to give a metaphysical framework that enables us to understand my thesis that intentions are embodied, I will consider two interrelated theories: the causal power theory and what I call the intentional theory of disposition. The causal power theory opposes to the Humean understanding of causation that understands it to be a relation between two separate events, and rather argues that causation is a manifestation of a disposition (cf. Molnar; Mumford). The intentional theory of disposition claims that the intention is not the mark of the mental, but of the dispositional (cf. Place). In other words, dispositions are *directed* to their manifestations. Combining the two theories, I can conclude that the causal relation between the intention and the action is to be understood as

the manifestation (in other words, fulfillment or embodiment) of the intention. This conclusion goes well together with the phenomenological first-person approach to action.